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1. Introduction
We report on an experimental investigation of Scalar Implicatures (SIs) and Presupposi-
tions (Ps) in individuals with Broca’s Aphasia (BAs) as compared to typical adults (TAs)
and children. The (b)-inferences for the (a)-sentences below illustrate SIs and Ps respec-
tively:
(1) a. Not all of the giraffes have scarves.
b. ↪→Some of the giraffes have scarves
(2) a. The Bear didn’t win the race.
b. ↪→The Bear participated in the race
The study contributes both a novel perspective on the comprehension abilities of BAs
and new experimental data bearing on the theoretical analysis of SIs and Ps. BAs typi-
cally display impairments in interpreting syntactically ‘complex’ sentences (e.g. Grodzin-
sky 2000, Grillo 2005). This is commonly attributed to a processing deficit, which is posited
to either affect syntax specifically (e.g. Burkhardt et al. 2008, Santi & Grodzinsky 2012),
or processing resources more generally (e.g. Caplan et al. 2007, Avrutin & Baauw 2013).
To date, little is known about whether pragmatic inferences such as SIs and Ps pose any
difficulties for these individuals. This could plausibly be the case if (at least some of) these
inferences are associated with a processing cost for typical adults, as has been argued in
much recent literature (e.g. Bott & Noveck 2004, Huang & Snedeker 2009, Chemla & Bott
2014, Romoli & Schwarz 2014).
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In relation to the theoretical treatment of SIs and Ps, recent work in semantics and prag-
matics has reconsidered the traditional distinction between these inferences (at least for cer-
tain P-triggers), with some authors arguing for a unified analysis (Chemla 2009a, Romoli
2013, 2014). While the relevant theories are not necessarily committed to specific accounts
of these inferences in processing and acquisition, experimental work across populations
nonetheless can inform the theoretical debate in crucial ways, as differences between them
in processing and acquisition pose a challenge for unified accounts (see Chemla & Bott
2014 and Tieu et al. 2015 for discussion). Indeed, some recent work on language acquisi-
tion (Bill, Romoli, Schwarz, & Crain 2015) and typical adult sentence processing (Chemla
& Bott 2014) reveal apparent differences between SIs and Ps, thereby posing at least prima
facie challenges to a unified approach.
In this paper we show that the comparison of BA’s performance on SIs and Ps to that of
typical adults and children can provide a multidimensional perspective, with the potential
for richer sets of conclusions in each of the two areas. In particular, BAs have commonly
been found to struggle precisely with those complex constructions that emerge late in lan-
guage acquisition (e.g. Jakobson 1971, Avrutin 2000). Moreoever, existing experimental
work has shown that children’s behavioral responses to both types of inferences differs
from those of adults (Noveck 2001, Bill et al. 2015), and also points to corresponding com-
plexities in processing by typical adults (Bott & Noveck 2004, Huang & Snedeker 2009).
In light of these findings, the present study was designed to directly assess the relation
between the apparent processing limitations in BA and these previous findings. The main
result is that BAs perform on par with adults on SIs, but display a response pattern to Ps
that is more similar to that of children. We discuss implications for both our understanding
of the comprehension impairment in BA and for theoretical accounts of the two inferences
in question.
2. Background
2.1 Theoretical Background
2.1.1 Optionality: Readings with and without the inferences
As illustrated above, SIs and Ps are inferences that systematically arise for certain sen-
tences. However, one of the important characteristics shared by both of these inferences is
that, in certain contexts, they can be rescinded. This is illustrated in (3-a) and (4-a), where
the continuation makes clear that the inference is not warranted. Also note the contrast with
simple entailments in (3-b) and (4-b), which - of course - cannot be cancelled.
(3) a. Some of the giraffes have scarves, in fact, all of them do!
b. Some of the giraffes have scarves #in fact, none of them do!
(4) a. The Bear didn’t win the race, in fact, he didn’t even participate!
b. The Bear and the pig didn’t come to the race, #in fact, the Bear came!
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Theoretical accounts thus face the challenge of explaining both how the relevant inferences
arise when they are present, as well as accounting for their absence in other cases.
2.1.2 Traditional Theoretical Approaches
Scalar Implicatures Under traditional approaches, following Grice (1975) and Horn
(1972), SIs are derived from reasoning about speaker intentions in light of basic assump-
tions about co-operative communication: co-operative speakers generally aim to make
maximally informative, relevant, and true statements. Roughly speaking, a speaker uttering
a sentence with the weak scalar term some, as in (5-a), invites the hearer to infer that the
speaker could not truthfully utter the more informative (5-b) with the strong scalar alterna-
tive all. This, in turn, leads to an interpretation of (5-a) as (5-c).
(5) a. Some of the giraffes have scarves.
b. All of the giraffes have scarves.
c. ↪→Some but not all of the giraffes have scarves
The same account applies to strong scalar items under negation: a speaker uttering (6-a)
instead of the relevant and more informative (6-b) leads the hearer to infer that (6-b) is
false, resulting in the interpretation in (6-c).
(6) a. Not all of the giraffes have scarves.
b. It is not that case that some of the giraffes have scarves.
(≈ none of the giraffes have scarves)
c. ↪→Not all of the giraffes have scarves, but some of them do
Just as in the case of some, the inference in (6-b) is not necessarily present, e.g., when
continuing (6-a) with . . . in fact, none of them did. While treated uniformly, the cases of
(5-b) and (6-b) are sometimes referred to as a Direct Scalar Implicature (DSI) and Indirect
Scalar Implicature (ISI) respectively. We will adopt this terminology here.
Presuppositions Ps are traditionally seen as appropriateness conditions on the conversa-
tional context, whereby a sentence such as (7-a) is assumed to be felicitous only if (7-b) is
already established in the common ground (Stalnaker 1973). Unlike SIs, Ps are commonly
assumed to be conventionally encoded in the lexical entry of presupposition triggers, such
as the verb win.
(7) a. The Bear won the race
b. ↪→The Bear participated in the race
A central challenge in presupposition theory is how to account for Ps in complex sentences,
where presuppositions commonly ‘project’, i.e., remain present at the utterance level de-
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spite the presence of embedding operators. For instance, (8-a), (8-b) and (8-c) all give rise
to the inference in (7-b) as well, while not conveying that the Bear won in any way.
(8) a. The Bear didn’t win the race.
b. It is possible that the Bear won the race.
c. Did the Bear win the race?
However, as seen in (4-a) above, (8-a) also has a reading without the inference. In order
to account for this reading, traditional approaches assume an extra mechanism (e.g. local
accommodation, Heim 1983) that results in the presuppositional content being treated on
par with the asserted content. Thus in (8-a) the presuppositional content is interpreted in
the scope of negation (i.e., it’s not true that Bear participated and won); an interpreta-
tion that is compatible with a continuation negating the inference (e.g., . . . he did not even
participate!).
2.1.3 Recent approaches to presuppositions
A number of recent proposals argue that (certain) Ps are actually more similar to SIs than
assumed by traditional approaches (Abusch 2010, Chemla 2010, Romoli 2014).1 In partic-
ular, Romoli (2014) treats the Ps of triggers such as win in parallel to strong scalar terms
in the scope of negation (as in (6)). To illustrate the idea, the inference in (9-c) is derived
from (9-a) as an SI invoking the same mechanisms assumed to underlie traditional SIs:
the speaker said (9-a) when they could have said the more informative and relevant (9-b),
leading the hearer to infer that (9-b) is false and thereby deriving the inference in (9-c).
(9) a. The Bear didn’t win the race.
b. The Bear didn’t participate in the race.
c. ↪→The Bear participated in the race
This unified account predicts that SIs and Ps should generally behave uniformly. Any dif-
ference between them therefore poses a potential challenge. Our study builds on Bill et al.
(2015) by evaluating how the differences found there relate to the performance of BAs.
2.2 Experimental background
2.2.1 Scalar implicatures
In the last decade or so, SIs have been the subject of a substantial body of experimental
research (Chemla & Singh 2014, Katsos & Cummins 2010), both in processing by typical
adults and in language acquisition. The general thrust of much of this work is that SIs are
1There are also various recent proposals for analyzing SIs in different terms as grammatically based on
silent exhaustivity operators Chierchia et al. (in press), Fox (2007). However, our present focus is on the
relation between Ps and SIs, so we do not consider these proposals in detail here.
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acquired later by children and processed slower by adults (starting from Noveck 2001, Bott
& Noveck 2004). Work in acquisition has revealed a mixed picture for DSIs with results
varying across types of SIs, experimental tasks, and ages (e.g. Geurts & Van Tiel to appear,
Tieu et al. 2015). However, one robust finding is that the responses of children (aged around
4-5) are more likely than adults to be based on an interpretation lacking the SI inference.2
While typical adults generally tend to judge sentences such as (5-a) based on an inter-
pretation that includes the SI inference, much processing evidence has been taken as indi-
cating that these interpretations are nonetheless associated with a processing cost. This has
been supported by both reaction time (e.g. Bott & Noveck 2004, Cremers & Chemla 2013)
and eye tracking studies (e.g. Huang & Snedeker 2009), which report behavioral delays
for SI interpretations. These delays have been attributed to a number of possible sources,
e.g., the generation or the comparison of alternatives, the use of contextual information in
deciding which alternatives are relevant or the complexity of the sentence meaning with
and without the inference (Chemla 2009b, Chemla & Bott 2013). Note, however, that some
recent research has questioned whether SIs are in fact associated with a delay (e.g. Grodner
et al. 2010, Breheny et al. 2013, Schwarz et al. 2015), and we will return to this issue below.
2.2.2 Presuppositions
Until recently, Ps have received much less attention in the experimental literature (see
Schwarz 2015 for a review of the existing work on Ps). That said, a recent study by Bill
et al. (2015) indicates that in contrast to their behaviour with SIs, children readily com-
pute P inferences but struggle with the suspension of Ps under negation (as in (4-a); see
discussion in section 3 below). In addition, various reaction time studies (e.g. Chemla &
Bott 2013, Schwarz 2014) indicate that Ps are not associated with a delay. In contrast, the
interpretations without P-inferences of sentences with P-triggers have been found to be
costly for typical adults (Chemla & Bott 2014, Romoli & Schwarz 2014). In other words,
accepting a negative sentence with a P-trigger in a context that is compatible with its P
is faster than one in a context incompatible with it (e.g. Chemla & Bott 2014, Romoli &
Schwarz 2014). Hence, in contrast to SIs, it seems to be the absence, not the presence of
the inference that results in higher processing costs for Ps.
2.3 Broca’s aphasia and the comparative approach
Individuals with Broca’s Aphasia (BAs) show an impairment on complex syntactic con-
structions such as non-canonical sentences where an argument has been moved from its
original position (e.g. Grodzinsky 2000, Friedmann 2003).3 This has been attributed to a
processing limitation that affects the correct instantiation of grammatical operations (e.g.
2Less research has focussed on ISIs, but the existing work suggests results parallel to those for DSIs (e.g.
Musolino & Lidz 2006, Katsos & Cummins 2010).
3We use Broca’s aphasia (BA) here to refer to a collection of symptoms associated with damage to the
left inferior frontal gyrus. Agrammatic BA is a subtype of this syndrome. The main linguistic symptom of
agrammatic BA is a reduction in the ability to produce coherent and complete sentences and a reduced ability
to assign meaning to complex syntactic constructions in comprehension.
Kennedy, Bill, Schwarz, Crain, Folli and Romoli
Avrutin 2006, Burkhardt et al. 2008) or to a more general reduction in processing re-
sources that impacts the interpretation of ‘complex’ syntactic constructions (e.g. Caplan
et al. 2013).4 Independent work from online tasks also indicates that BAs show evidence
processing difficulties, as seen by delayed lexical access and delayed priming effects (e.g.
Swinney et al. 2000, Love et al. 2008). It is possible however, that the performance of BAs
on complex syntactic phenomena is only one piece of the puzzle. In order to refine the
picture of the linguistic and processing capacities in BA, we need to move outside of the
traditional domain of syntax to look at other ‘complex’ phenomena. Inferences such as SIs
and Ps provide an ideal opportunity to expand the scope of research on comprehension in
BAs and assess whether the observed impairment is syntax-specific or whether it affects
‘complex’ phenomena more generally, reflecting a domain-general processing limitation.
A further motivation for looking at this domain in BA is the well-known parallels be-
tween the linguistic profiles of BAs and children acquiring language (e.g. Jakobson 1971,
Avrutin 2000 among many others), such that phenomena that are acquired later by chil-
dren tend to be more vulnerable in BA. Whilst there is an extensive body of literature on
children’s acquisition of pragmatic inferences (and SIs in particular), we are aware of no
research to date that has investigated the comprehension performance of BAs on such in-
ferences. Theories of SIs and Ps are often underspecified with respect to the link to the
underlying processing mechanisms involved in their acquisition. Looking at them in com-
parison, however, provides a simple yet powerful tool for testing the predictions of unified
accounts of how these inferences are derived. This approach has already been successfully
applied to the study of SIs and Ps in children and adults (Bill et al. 2015). The current study
extends this approach to the investigation of SIs and Ps in another population, namely in-
dividuals with BA, and compares their performance to that of the children and adults as
reported in Bill et al. (2015).
3. Previous experiment: Adults vs. children
This section provides a detailed review of the Bill et al. (2015) study, as it formed the basis
of the current study of BAs, and it provides the comparison data from typical adults and
children. Using a version of the sentence picture matching task (The Covered Box task,
e.g. Huang & Snedeker 2009), the main aim of the study was to evaluate the predictions of
a unified approach that sees (certain) Ps as a type of SIs (see 2.1.3), by comparing typical
adults (TAs; n=20) to two groups of children (16 4-5 year olds, 14 7 year olds).
4Note that earlier versions of grammatical accounts of comprehension in BA (e.g. The Trace Deletion Hy-
pothesis, Grodzinsky 2000) attribute the comprehension pattern in BA to a loss of some aspect of grammar
rather than to a processing impairment. However, more recent versions of TDH-type accounts are not com-
mitted to the idea that this is strictly a structural rather than a processing issue (Grodzinsky 2006, Friedmann
2003, Santi & Grodzinsky 2012).
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SI condition:
Not all giraffes have a scarf
DSI condition:
Some giraffes have a scarf
Ps condition:
The Bear didn’t win the race
Figure 1: Illustration of target pictures used in critical trials.
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Materials and procedure
Each trial consisted of a context picture and two test pictures, one visible and one cov-
ered. To ‘set the scene’ and to ensure felicity in accordance with the ‘condition of plausible
dissent’ (Crain et al. 1996), the experimenter produced a short description of the context
picture followed by a test sentence that described just one of the two (visible or covered)
test pictures. The participant’s task was to decide for each test sentence whether it described
the visible or the covered picture. On the critical trials, the visible picture was only con-
sistent with the literal meaning of the sentence. Its selection therefore indicated that the
participant’s response was based on an interpretation of the sentence without the relevant
inference. Selection of the covered picture, on the other hand, indicated that the partici-
pants were accessing the inference. After a training phase with feedback, participants were
tested on 12 target trials (4 trials per condition – DSI, ISI and Ps). Examples of visible pic-
tures are shown in Figure 1. There were 12 control trials, 6 in which the test sentence was
consistent with the overt picture and 6 where it wasn’t and thus required a covered picture
choice. These controls ensured that participants could correctly accept both the overt and
covered pictures in the relevant contexts. Only participants who responded correctly to at
least 3 out of the 4 controls per condition were included in the analysis.
3.2 Results and discussion
Logistic regression mixed effect models confirmed that the rate of covered box choices
(indicating computation of the inference) depended on both group and type of inference.
First, there was an interaction between Inference Type and Age Group. Secondly, there
were significant simple effects of group for TAs vs children on both SIs and Ps, but in
opposite directions, with more covered box choices by adults for SIs and more covered
box choices by children for Ps.5 In other words, children were more likely than adults to
respond based on a literal interpretation of SIs (consistent with the existing literature) whilst
adults were more likely to respond based on an interpretation without the inference for Ps.
5In addition, there were some differences between DSIs and ISIs. See Bill et al. (2015) for details.
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The results of this study pose a potential challenge for unified approaches to SIs and Ps,
but are fully consistent with traditional approaches. This study provides novel evidence that
while inference interpretations of SIs are hard for children (or, at any rate, less common),
they are readily accessible when it comes to Ps. In other words, for Ps it is the interpretation
without the inference that seems hard for them to access.
4. Current experiment
Given the similarities between acquisition and BA in other linguistic domains, as well as
the commonly assumed processing limitations in this population, it is plausible that BAs
would relate to SIs and Ps in similar ways, and thus struggle with SI interpretations as well
as interpretations without the P inference, thus replicating the asymmetric performance of
children on these phenomena. Utilising the same methods and materials as those described
in section 3, the current study tested a group of individuals with BA and compared their
performance to the adults and the children from (Bill et al. 2015). This approach provides
novel data on the performance of BAs on ‘complex’ phenomena outside the traditional
domain of syntax. It also extends Bill et al. (2015) to further inform the theoretical debate
about the relationship between SIs and Ps.
4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Participants
Nine individuals diagnosed with BA (age 48-63 years, M=53.4, time post onset 1.4-9 years,
M=5.6) took part in the study.6 They were selected on the basis of several criteria: (i) As-
sessment on the Western Aphasia Battery (WAB, Kertesz 1982) (ii) typically agrammatic
speech production and (iii) impaired comprehension performance on non-canonical sen-
tences (Passives and object clefts) on the Verb and Sentence Test (VAST, Bastiaanse et al.
2003). They all showed an asymmetry in performance on canonical and non-canonical sen-
tences indicating evidence of a processing limitation. The adults and children groups were
those of Bill et al. (2015).
4.2 Results
The rate of covered box choices (indicating the inference interpretation) for the three
groups is shown in Figure 2a below. Figure 2b shows the covered box choices for the BAs,
typical adults and the group of 7 year old children. As there was no significant difference
between the DSI and ISI condition for BAs, we pooled the results for SIs. Similarly, the
results for 4-5 and 7-year olds were pooled for the present analysis as well. The main focus
of analysis were tests of interactions between group (BAs vs. TAs and BAs vs. Children)
and inference type (SIs vs. Ps), using logistic regression mixed effect models.
First, looking at the comparison between BAs and TAs on SIs and Ps, we found a
group by inference type interaction (p < .05 ), due to the higher rate of selection of the
6Individuals with BA were all recruited from StrokeNI.
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Figure 2: Rate (%) of CB choices by group on SIs and Ps
covered box option by BAs for Ps at a marginally significant level (p< 0.1). Covered box
rates were higher for SIs than Ps for both typical adults (p< .001) and BAs (p< .05). No
effect of group was found for SIs (p > .9). Turning to the comparison between BAs and
children, there was again an interaction (p< .001), which was driven by a simple effect of
inference type for children (P > SI; p < .001) that went in the opposite direction as that
for BAs (as well as adults; for details on this comparison, see Bill et al. 2015). BAs had
significantly higher covered box rates than children for SIs (p < .01), while they did not
differ significantly for Ps (p = .15). Whilst BAs tended to reject the overt picture more
frequently than adults on both the SI and P conditions, this cannot be simply related to a
response bias (choosing the cover box) as all participants included in the analysis showed
that they could correctly accept and reject the overt picture in the relevant contexts on the
control trials.
In sum, BAs were on a par with typical adults with SIs in giving an inference-based
response in the majority of cases. In contrast, BAs were more similar to children for Ps,
with elevated rates of covered box choices relative to the typical adults. In addition, when
we look at the comparison between the 7-year-old children and BAs, we find that these
groups are completely on a par with respect to the P condition, as shown in Figure 2b.
5. Discussion
The current study investigated the interpretation of SIs and Ps in a group of BAs and com-
pared their performance to data from children and typical adults from Bill et al. (2015).
This study had two main goals. The first goal was to provide novel data on how BAs en-
gage with sentences containing two types of inferences. The results indicated that despite
the potential processing cost associated with SI inferences, BAs performed in-line with
typical adults, and generally responded based on the inference interpretation. Their perfor-
mance on Ps, however, was more comparable to children (in particular, the group of 7-year
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olds), in that they were less likely than typical adults to respond based on an interpretation
without the relevant inference.
Starting from the second point, the outcome is in line with previous findings that sug-
gest that accessing an interpretation without a P-inference is associated with a processing
cost, such that responses based on interpretations with the inference are faster than those
based on interpretations without the inference (Chemla & Bott 2014, Romoli & Schwarz
2014, among others). This may be related to the role of an additional mechanism, such
as ‘local accommodation’ (Heim 1983), which is required to access a reading without the
inference. The fact that BA’s performance on Ps is comparable to that of children further
adds to the hypothesis that the processing challenges they face correspond to phenomena
that are relatively late in acquisition. In sum, the results of the current study show that
BAs have a specific difficulty with accessing interpretations without the P-inference in the
relevant sentences due to a limitation in processing resources. This provides evidence that
these BAs show an impairment on complex phenomena outside of the domain of syntax.
In contrast, BA’s performance on SIs, which is parallel to that of typical adults, is
surprising in light of arguments in the literature that the mechanisms underlying SIs are
associated with a processing cost (e.g. Huang & Snedeker 2009, Chemla & Bott 2014).
The question is why BA’s performance on SIs is not affected by this assumed processing
cost. There are two potential hypotheses to explore. First, these results could be seen to
suggest a selective deficit in BA, affecting the processes underlying Ps cancellation but
sparing those underlying SIs, presumably due to underlying differences in processing these
inferences. However, it is not necessarily clear at this point exactly how to characterize
such a difference in processing cost. Under this hypothesis, the results could provide evi-
dence that BAs do not suffer from a domain-general reduction in processing abilities, but
a selective deficit, which affects the process involved in generating interpretations with-
out P-inferences (such as local accommodation), perhaps because this involves a type of
complexity broadly similar to the well-studied cases of complexity associated with various
syntactic phenomena.
An alternative account of the performance asymmetry on SIs and Ps is that BAs do
not struggle with SIs because they are not as costly as previously assumed. This would be
consistent with recent eye-tacking studies (e.g. Grodner et al. 2010, Breheny et al. 2013),
which appear to indicate that SIs are computed immediately and not delayed in relation
to the literal interpretation. Under this interpretation we can derive a more uniform pat-
tern of performance in BA, where performance deviates from typical adults specifically
in cases where there is an increased processing load. This would also be consistent with
certain processing-based accounts of comprehension in BA, which propose that complex
linguistic phenomena are affected as a factor of their relative complexity (see Caplan et al.
2013 for a review of the evidence for such an account). In sum, if we assume that SIs are
not (that) costly, we would not expect them to pose a challenge for BAs. Assuming this
hypothesis leaves us with the challenge of explaining children’s well-documented perfor-
mance with SIs, specifically the fact that they are more likely to respond based on a literal
interpretation of a sentence. In this regard, various proposals in the literature argue that
children’s problems with SIs are in fact not related to the processing cost of these infer-
ences, but to other factors such as lack of knowledge of the relevant lexical alternatives or
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difficulty in accessing them (Barner et al. 2011, Chierchia 2011; also see Tieu et al. 2015),
or to children’s increased tolerance for pragmatic infelicity (Katsos & Cummins 2010).
The second overall goal of this study was to further investigate the comparison between
SIs and Ps in relation to the theoretical debate outlined in section 2.3. The present findings
are parallel to those of Bill et al. (2015) and provide further evidence that SIs and Ps differ.
This is prima facie more consistent with a traditional approach which distinguishes SIs and
Ps theoretically. In contrast, they represent a challenge for uniform proposals (e.g. Romoli
2014), which derive Ps and SIs in parallel ways (but see Bill et al. 2015 for discussion of
a proposal on how this approach could be modified to explain this asymmetry). Finally,
the current study further investigated the hypothesis that there are similarities in linguistic
comprehension between BAs and children. The results indicate that whilst BAs appear to
perform like children on Ps, they perform like adults on SIs. This finding provides novel
evidence for divergent performance by children and BAs on ‘complex’ phenomena beyond
the domain of syntax.7
6. Conclusion
The current study provides novel evidence on the interpretation of SI and P-inferences in
BAs and adds further evidence for a traditional approach to SIs and Ps. More specifically,
the study had two main goals. The first goal was to provide novel data on the interpreta-
tion of SIs and Ps in BA in order to refine the picture of what is impaired and retained
in this disorder. The results indicate an asymmetry in the performance of BAs on SIs and
Ps in comparison to typical adults. This could implicate a selective deficit, affecting the
processes underlying access to interpretations without a P-inference and sparing those un-
derlying SI interpretation due to underlying processing differences. Future research will
further investigate the potential underlying processing differences between SIs and Ps in
BA by investigating whether the difference on behavioural measures is also reflected in
processing measures such as reaction times and eye movement patterns. Alternatively this
result could imply that responding based on a SI is not costly whilst responding based on an
interpretation whereby a P has been suspended is costly (consistent with processing data
on typical adults, e.g. Chemla & Bott 2014). In relation to the second goal of the study,
the results indicate that, in line with the findings of Bill et al. (2015), BAs also show an
asymmetric performance on SIs and Ps. This provides further evidence against a unified
approach to these inferences. In comparing acquisition and aphasia, we found that BAs
differed from children on SIs but performed in a similar way on Ps. This provides evidence
from a novel domain for an asymmetry in the performance of BAs and children and may
implicate different underlying sources for the linguistic performance of these populations.
A further extension of this work would involve extending the multidimensional compara-
7Considering that BA has traditionally been characterised as a grammatical disorder (e.g. Grodzinsky
2000), one might be tempted to interpret the performance of this group on SIs as evidence for a more prag-
matic approach to the derivation of these phenomena. However, considering that the status of the grammar in
BA is still a matter of debate, we cannot conclude that their performance on SIs vs. Ps can inform the ongoing
debate on the grammatical vs. pragmatic status of SIs. Thanks to Kathryn Davidson (p.c.) for discussion on
this point.
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tive approach with these three populations to the investigation of similar types of inferences
in BAs (for example plurality inferences; see Tieu et al. 2014).
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